论文信息 - On Bargaining Sets in Symmetric Games

On Bargaining Sets in Symmetric Games

The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set coincides with the core' is not a prosperity property.

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