A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods

We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from quad...

[1]  H. Varian,et al.  On the private provision of public goods , 1986 .

[2]  William Vickrey,et al.  The City as a Firm , 1977 .

[3]  Jerry R. Green,et al.  Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods , 1977 .

[4]  A. Atkinson,et al.  The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation , 1976 .

[5]  Ian Ayres,et al.  Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance , 2002 .

[6]  P. Krugman Increasing Returns and Economic Geography , 1991 .

[7]  R. Hinde,et al.  The Possibility of Cooperation@@@Cooperation: The Basis of Sociability.@@@Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior.@@@Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. , 1990 .

[8]  F. Ramsey A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation , 1927 .

[9]  W. Easterly,et al.  The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good , 2006 .

[10]  Russell D. Roberts,et al.  Government subsidies to private spending on public goods , 1992 .

[11]  A. Alesina,et al.  On the Number and Size of Nations , 1995 .

[12]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .

[13]  Anand Giridharadas,et al.  Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World , 2018 .

[14]  P. Samuelson The Pure Theory of Public Expanditure , 1954 .

[15]  H. Bowen,et al.  The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources , 1943 .

[16]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents , 1990 .

[17]  Michael H. Rothkopf,et al.  Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical , 2007, Oper. Res..

[18]  Philip H. Dybvig,et al.  Adoption externalities as public goods , 1983 .

[19]  Yochai Benkler,et al.  The wealth of networks: how social production transforms markets and freedom , 2006 .

[20]  J. Falkinger,et al.  Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations from average , 1996 .

[21]  Markus Jakobsson,et al.  Coercion-resistant electronic elections , 2005, WPES '05.

[22]  S. Lalley,et al.  Nash Equilibria for Quadratic Voting , 2018 .

[23]  Zoë Hitzig,et al.  Bridging the 'Normative Gap': Mechanism Design and Social Justice , 2018 .

[24]  J. Jacobs The Death and Life of Great American Cities , 1962 .

[25]  E. H. Clarke Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[26]  Dimitrios Xefteris,et al.  Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms , 2018 .

[27]  Theodore C. Bergstrom,et al.  DO GOVERNMENTS SPEND TOO MUCH? , 1979, National Tax Journal.