Competition and Access in Telecoms : ECPR , Global Price Cap , and Auctions *

Many network industries (telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, postal services, water and sewage services, etc.) are confronted with significant logistic and behavioral problems in their transition towards competition. In this article, I first recall some general principes and fundamental facts and issues before proceeding with the basic procedures through which competition can be introduced in telecommunications markets, that is the access pricing rules. I compare the efficient component pricing rule, the Ramsay pricing rule, the global price cap rule, and show how the latter could in fact be an answer to many of the concerns and questions raised in the search for an efficient way to introduce competition in telecommunications markets. I then continue by presenting some recent research on network access auctions, a possible approach to increasing competition with soft or light-handed regulation. I then conclude by raising some neglected albeit important issues. Les industries-reseaux (telecommunications, electricite, gaz naturel, services postaux, services d'aqueduc et d'egouts, etc.) font face a de serieux problemes dans leur transition vers la concurrence. Dans cet article, je rappelle d'abord quelques faits et principes avant de discuter des procedures par lesquelles la concurrence peut etre introduite, a savoir les regles et conditions d'acces aux reseaux. Je compare la regle de tarification efficace des composantes, la regle de Ramsey et la regle du plafonnement global des prix et je montre que cette derniere peut etre la reponse a plusieurs questions soulevees dans la recherche d'une approche efficace a la transition vers la concurrence. Je poursuis avec la presentation d'un mecanisme d'enchere qui pourrait aussi permettre le developpement ordonne de la concurrence. En conclusion, je rappelle divers facteurs generalement negliges0501s neanmoins importants.