Discounting and Augmentation in Causal Conditional Reasoning: Causal Models or Shallow Encoding?

Recent research comparing mental models theory and causal Bayes nets for their ability to account for discounting and augmentation inferences in causal conditional reasoning had some limitations. One of the experiments used an ordinal scale and multiple items and analysed the data by subjects and items. This procedure can create a variety of problems that can be resolved by using an appropriate cumulative link function mixed models approach in which items are treated as random effects. Experiment 1 replicated this earlier experiment and analysed the results using appropriate data analytic techniques. Although successfully replicating earlier research, the pattern of results could be explained by a much simpler “shallow encoding” hypothesis. Experiment 2 introduced a manipulation to critically test this hypothesis. The results favoured the causal Bayes nets predictions and not shallow encoding and were not consistent with mental models theory. Experiment 1 provided qualified support for the causal Bayes net approach using appropriate statistics because it also replicated the failure to observe one of the predicted main effects. Experiment 2 discounted one plausible explanation for this failure. While within the limited goals that were set for these experiments they were successful, more research is required to account for the pattern of findings using this paradigm.

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