Integrity management in GUARDS

We present an approach for the management of highly critical tasks coexisting with non-critical tasks in a single processor or multiprocessor architecture. To prevent error propagation from non-critical to critical tasks, an integrity level is assigned to groups of tasks according to their trustworthiness. Multiple levels of integrity are implemented using spatial and temporal isolation, and mediation via an integrity policy. The integrity policy defines the rules for data flow between integrity levels and resource utilisation by the tasks at different levels. Since the GUARDS project aims to provide generic solutions for a variety of application domains, the described integrity management can be implemented either in a middleware, the operating system or both. In this paper, we show a CORBA-compliant implementation of the integrity policy.

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