论文信息 - The informational content of household decisions with applications to insurance under adverse selection

The informational content of household decisions with applications to insurance under adverse selection

We discuss how to detect the informational content of household decisions among the explanatory variables of econometric models. Two applications to the choice of automobile insurance contracts and the demand for life insurance are provided. We show that the information provided by additional decision variables is rather weak and often non significant.

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