A new architecture for intelligent agents to join a currently existing coalition

The coalition formation (CF) is one of the dynamic organization methods for agents to collaborate under common goals. According to the existing protocols, agents only able to join a coalition when it receives invitation from other or form its own coalition. The idle agents have suffered the limitation of being not able to join the existing coalition. To address this issue, we have introduced join coalition architecture (JCA) that enables agents to join currently existing coalition. The JCA is based on the framework that accounts agents' social, individual control, budget and trust. This paper has addressed the two major coalition's management approaches such as (1) microscopic and (2) macroscopic based coalition. The experiments have shown the idle agents are able to join the existing coalition and will be discussed.

[1]  Ashutosh Kumar Singh,et al.  A review on dependence graph in social reasoning mechanism , 2012, Artificial Intelligence Review.

[2]  Olivier Boissier,et al.  ASIC: An Architecture for Social and Individual Control and its Application to Computer Vision , 1994, MAAMAW.

[3]  Jordi Sabater-Mir,et al.  Review on Computational Trust and Reputation Models , 2005, Artificial Intelligence Review.

[4]  Chunyan Miao,et al.  Algorithms for Transitive Dependence-Based Coalition Formation , 2007, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics.

[5]  Torsten Eymann,et al.  A survey on reputation systems for artificial societies , 2009 .

[6]  Morton D. Davis,et al.  The kernel of a cooperative game , 1965 .

[7]  Daniel Thalmann,et al.  A high-level architecture for believable social agents , 2000, Virtual Reality.

[8]  Gerhard Weiss,et al.  Multiagent Systems , 1999 .

[9]  Matthias Klusch,et al.  Dynamic Coalition Formation among Rational Agents , 2002, IEEE Intell. Syst..

[10]  Franco Zambonelli,et al.  Developing multiagent systems: The Gaia methodology , 2003, TSEM.

[11]  Victor R. Lesser,et al.  A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms , 2004, The Knowledge Engineering Review.

[12]  L. Shapley.  A Value for n-person Games , 1988 .

[13]  Sarvapali D. Ramchurn,et al.  A computational trust model for multi-agent interactions based on confidence and reputation , 2003 .

[14]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems, Second Edition , 2009 .

[15]  Graçaliz Pereira Dimuro,et al.  Quantifying Degrees of Dependence in Social Dependence Relations , 2006, MABS.

[16]  Yves Demazeau,et al.  On Social Reasoning in Multi-Agent Systems , 2001, Inteligencia Artif..

[17]  Jaime Simão Sichman,et al.  Dependence Graphs: Dependence Within and Between Groups , 2002, Comput. Math. Organ. Theory.

[18]  Bo An,et al.  Transitive Dependence Based Formation of Virtual Organizations , 2005, CIS.

[19]  Reza Monsefi,et al.  A novel algorithm for coalition formation in Multi-Agent Systems using cooperative game theory , 2010, 2010 18th Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering.

[20]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  The Gaia Methodology for Agent-Oriented Analysis and Design , 2000, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.

[21]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  Introduction to multiagent systems , 2001 .

[22]  Douglas B. Moran,et al.  The Open Agent Architecture: A Framework for Building Distributed Software Systems , 1999, Appl. Artif. Intell..

[23]  Jaime Simão Sichman,et al.  Multi-agent dependence by dependence graphs , 2002, AAMAS '02.

[24]  Chunyan Miao,et al.  A Coalition Formation Framework Based on Transitive Dependence , 2005, IEICE Trans. Inf. Syst..

[25]  Yves Demazeau,et al.  A Social Reasoning Mechanism Based On Dependence Networks , 1997, ECAI.

[26]  Graça Gaspar,et al.  A Social Reasoning Mechanism Based on a New Approach for Coalition Formation , 2000 .

[27]  M. Whinston,et al.  Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts , 1987 .