The Effect of War Chests on Challenger Entry in U.S. House Elections

chest deters potential challengers from entering a congressional race. I discuss theoretical arguments for and against deterrence. I find that previous analyses of war chests have omitted important variables, and thus, their conclusions are suspect. Using data from the 1984-1998 U.S. House elections, I employ a bivariate probit model with sample selection to test whether large war chests deter highor low-quality challengers from entering a race. Once previously omitted variables are included, I find that war chests do not deter challengers. C onventional wisdom states that an incumbent with a large war chest will deter challengers. Since the surest way to get reelected is to run without opposition, incumbents may carry a large war chest to prevent other candidates from running. And if incumbents cannot prevent all opponents from entering the race, incumbents may use war chests to try to deter strong opponents from running. Although there are many forces over which incumbents have little control (e.g., national partisan tides), incumbents can control how much cash they have at the beginning of the subsequent election cycle by not spending some of their money in the current election. Because a war chest is often seen as one of the unfair methods by which an incumbent remains entrenched in power, some campaign finance reforms have proposed that incumbents not be allowed to carry over any unspent money from one election to the next. For example, "through an initiative Missouri voters passed a 'spend-down' provision. It required candidates to return to contributors or to turn over to the state all but a little money left unspent from their campaigns. Its aim was to prevent candidates from amassing war chests in one election for use in another" (Corrado et al. 1997, 353; see also Donovan 1993). I examine here whether an incumbent can use a war chest to affect his or her odds of winning. Specifically, can a war chest be used to deter a high (or low) quality challenger from entering? I find, contrary to previous analyses, that war chests do not deter challengers.

[1]  Thomas A. Kazee Who runs for Congress? : ambition, context, and candidate emergence , 1994 .

[2]  M. Traugott,et al.  Preemptive and reactive spending in U.S. House races , 1986 .

[3]  Peter Zemsky,et al.  Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections , 1995, American Political Science Review.

[4]  G. Jacobson,et al.  The Politics of Congressional Elections , 1983 .

[5]  Tim Groseclose,et al.  The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth* , 1999, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[6]  D. Green,et al.  Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections , 1988, The Journal of Politics.

[7]  Jeffrey S. Banks,et al.  Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections , 1989 .

[8]  Peter E. Kennedy A Guide to Econometrics , 1979 .

[9]  P. Squire Challengers in U. S. Senate Elections , 1989 .

[10]  J. Milyo The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers , 1997 .

[11]  G. Jacobson,et al.  Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86 , 1989, American Political Science Review.

[12]  David T. Canon Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress , 1991, American Political Science Review.

[13]  Thomas A. Kazee The Decision to Run for the U. S. Congress: Challenger Attitudes in the 1970s , 1980 .

[14]  A. Corrado Campaign finance reform : a sourcebook , 1997 .

[15]  David Kaplan,et al.  Literacy and Voting Behavior: A Bivariate Probit Model with Sample Selection , 1994 .

[16]  Larry M. Bartels Instrumental and "Quasi-Instrumental" Variables , 1991 .

[17]  G. Jacobson,et al.  Strategy and choice in congressional elections , 1981 .

[18]  D. Green,et al.  The Dynamics of Campaign Fundraising in House Elections , 1994, The Journal of Politics.

[19]  G. Jacobson Money in congressional elections , 1980 .

[20]  Jeffrey A. Dubin,et al.  Selection Bias in Linear Regression, Logit and Probit Models , 1989 .

[21]  J. R. Bond,et al.  Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections , 1985, The Journal of Politics.

[22]  Adam J. Berinsky,et al.  The Two Faces of Public Opinion , 1999 .

[23]  Zvi Griliches,et al.  Specification Error in Probit Models , 1985 .

[24]  P. Hersch,et al.  Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in Congressional Races , 1994 .

[25]  R. Born Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters , 1986, American Political Science Review.

[26]  J. Heckman Sample selection bias as a specification error , 1979 .

[27]  Steven D. Levitt,et al.  Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[28]  P. Squire,et al.  Uncontested Seats and Electoral Competition for the U.S. House of Representatives Over Time , 1997, The Journal of Politics.

[29]  P. Squire Competition and Uncontested Seats in U. S. House Elections , 1989 .

[30]  R. Michael Alvarez,et al.  When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multiparty Elections , 1998 .

[31]  Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities. , 1992 .

[32]  F. Sorauf,et al.  Money in American elections , 1989, American Political Science Review.

[33]  J. Milyo The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach , 1998 .

[34]  W. V. D. Ven,et al.  The demand for deductibles in private health insurance: A probit model with sample selection , 1981 .

[35]  Tim Groseclose,et al.  Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102d House , 1994 .

[36]  Paul S. Herrnson,et al.  Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington , 1995 .

[37]  S. Ansolabehere,et al.  Campaign War Chests in Congressional Elections , 2000, Business and Politics.

[38]  L. Maisel From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary , 1986 .

[39]  H. Farber Worker Preferences for Union Representation , 1981 .

[40]  L. Fowler,et al.  Political Ambition: Who Decides to Run for Congress , 1990 .

[41]  Donald P. Green,et al.  Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections , 1988 .

[42]  Gregory A. Caldeira,et al.  Campaigning for the Supreme Court: The Dynamics of Public Opinion on the Thomas Nomination , 1996, The Journal of Politics.

[43]  Richard L. Hall,et al.  Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House , 1995, American Political Science Review.

[44]  P. Squire Candidates, Money, and Voters-Assessing the State of Congressional Elections Research , 1995 .

[45]  Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier,et al.  A Dynamic Analysis of The Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy , 1996 .

[46]  Donald A. Gross,et al.  A Systems Approach To Campaign Finance in U.S. House Elections , 1994 .