THE HARVARD HOUSING LOTTERY: RATIONALITY AND REFORM

This paper studies allocation schemes Harvard has used to assign undergraduates to residential houses. The main conclusions are as follows. First, students appear to behave remarkably rationally. Second, simulations suggest that, given rationality, Harvard's allocation scheme sometimes allocates fewer students to one of their top three choices than would occur under an alternative system that generates truthful revelation.

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