Emotions and the intelligibility of akratic action

They should make a claim on our attention, 1 have suggested, not just in relation to collectives but also in relation to individu ais. The image of the individual as an amalgam of different voices is only a metaphor, of course, and there is no suggestion that those voices have the autonomy of different persons or contribute to the view$ of an individual in the procedurally procrustean manner of vo ters. But the point it con veys is surely engaging: that there may be profit in thinking of the individual as a plurality of perspectives that interact in a continuing search for the unit y of a single, reasoned vision . And if we do think of the individual in that way then akrasia will have to be seen in the individual as weil as the collective case as a phenomenon that is n on-mechanical and non-hierarchical in nature and that is not exclusively action-centred in its manifestations. 4