Resilience Engineering : New directions for measuring and maintaining safety in complex systems Final Report , November 2008
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Erik Hollnagel | Sidney Dekker | Richard Cook | David Woods | E. Hollnagel | David D. Woods | S. Dekker | R. Cook
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