Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept

1. General Introduction.- 1.1. Informal description of games and game theory.- 1.2. Dynamic programming.- 1.3. Subgame perfect equilibria.- 1.4. Sequential equilibria and perfect equilibria.- 1.5. Perfect equilibria and proper equilibria.- 1.6. Essential equilibria and regular equilibria.- 1.7. Summary of the following chapters.- 1.8. Notational conventions.- 2. Games in Normal Form.- 2.1. Preliminaries.- 2.2. Perfect equilibria.- 2.3. Proper equilibria.- 2.4. Essential equilibria.- 2.5. Regular equilibria.- 2.6. An "almost all" theorem.- 3. Matrix and Bimatrix Games.- 3.1. Preliminaries.- 3.2. Perfect equilibria.- 3.3. Regular equilibria.- 3.4. Characterizations of regular equilibria.- 3.5. Matrix games.- 4. Control Costs.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. Games with control costs.- 4.3. Approachable equilibria.- 4.4. Proper equilibria.- 4.5. Perfect equilibria.- 4.6. Regular equilibria.- 5. Incomplete Information.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. Disturbed games.- 5.3. Stable equilibria.- 5.4. Perfect equilibria.- 5.5. Weakly proper equilibria.- 5.6. Strictly proper equilibria and regular equilibria.- 5.7. Proofs of the theorems of section 5.5..- 6. Extensive Form Games.- 6.1. Definitions.- 6.2. Equilibria and subgame perfectness.- 6.3. Sequential equilibria.- 6.4. Perfect equilibria.- 6.5. Proper equilibria.- 6.6. Control costs.- 6.7. Incomplete information.- References.- Survey.

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