More Revenue from Two Samples via Factor Revealing SDPs

We consider the classical problem of selling a single item to a single bidder whose value for the item is drawn from a regular distribution F, in a "data-poor'' regime where Fis not known to the seller, and very few samples from Fare available. Prior work [Dhangwatnotai et al '10] has shown that one sample from Fcan be used to attain a 1/2-factor approximation to the optimal revenue, but it has been challenging to improve this guarantee when more samples from Fare provided, even when two samples from Fare provided. In this case, the best approximation known to date is 0.509, achieved by the Empirical Revenue Maximizing (ERM) mechanism Babaioff et al. '18]. We improve this guarantee to 0.558, and provide a lower bound of 0.65. Our results are based on a general framework, based on factor-revealing Semidefinite Programming relaxations aiming to capture as tight as possible a superset of product measures of regular distributions, the challenge being that neither regularity constraints nor product measures are convex constraints. The framework is general and can be applied in more abstract settings to evaluate the performance of a policy chosen using independent samples from a distribution and applied on a fresh sample from that same distribution.

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