Privacy protection, control of information, and privacy-enhancing technologies

The present study is organized into two main parts. In Part I, we respond to a recent criticism that the restricted access theoryofprivacydoes not adequately explain the role that control of personal information plays in protecting one's priva~ In defending a version of the restricted access theory, we put forth a tripartite model that differentiates the concq~tofprivacyfrom both the justification and the management of privacy. This-distinction is important, we argue, because it enables us to avoid conflafing the concept of privacy which we define in terms of protection from intrusion and information gathering [Moor 1990; 1997], from the concept of control, which (a) is used to justifi/ the flaming of polities that provide privacy prrotection and (b) is essential to the management ofptivac~ Separating privacy from control is necessa~ we further argue, to preserve the identityofboth notions. After showingwhy the notion of individual control, as expressed in three different ways-choice, consent, and correction--plays an important role in the management ofpriva~ we conclude Part I with an account of why individual controls alone are not sufficient to guarantee the protection nfpersonal privacy and why certain external controls, such as those provided by privacy polities, are also needed. To illustrate some of the key points made in the first part of this essay we consider examples ofptivacy-enhancing technologies (or PETs) in Part II. We argue that even if PETs provide individuals with a means of controlling their personal information, these tools do not necessarily ensure privacy protection. Became PETs do not provide online users with a zone of privacy protection that incorporates external controls, i.e., controls beyond those at the individual level, we condude that the use of PETs can actually blur the need for privacy protection, rather than provide it.