The Evolution of Cooperation

Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.

[1]  R. Michod.  The Genetics of Altruism, Scott A. Boorman, Paul R. Levit. Academic Press, New York (1980), xx, +459. Price $29.50 , 1982 .

[2]  R. Punnett,et al.  The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection , 1930, Nature.

[3]  Roy L. Behr,et al.  Nice Guys Finish Last—Sometimes , 1981 .

[4]  F. Widmann,et al.  The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy , 1971 .

[5]  George C. Williams,et al.  Adaptation and Natural Selection , 2018 .

[6]  W. S. Silver.  Microbial ecology. , 1967, Science.

[7]  David Sloan Wilson,et al.  The Natural Selection Of Populations And Communities , 1981 .

[8]  Richard K. Betts,et al.  Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning , 1982 .

[9]  D. Janzen.  COEVOLUTION OF MUTUALISM BETWEEN ANTS AND ACACIAS IN CENTRAL AMERICA , 1966, Evolution; international journal of organic evolution.

[10]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[11]  M. Treisman.  Some difficulties in testing explanations for the occurrence of bird song dialects , 1980, Animal Behaviour.

[12]  R. Axelrod.  More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1980 .

[13]  Glenn Herald Snyder,et al.  “Prisoner's Dilemma” and “Chicken” Models in International Politics , 1971 .

[14]  Stuart Oskamp,et al.  Effects of programmed strategies on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and other mixed-motive games , 1971 .

[15]  M. Orlove.  Kin selection and cancer. , 1977, Journal of theoretical biology.

[16]  G. Tullock,et al.  A differential approach to the repeated prisoner's dilemma , 1971 .

[17]  Steve Rytina,et al.  The Arithmetic of Social Relations: The Interplay of Category and Network , 1982, American Journal of Sociology.

[18]  Eric A. Fischer.  The relationship between mating system and simultaneous hermaphroditism in the coral reef fish, Hypoplectrus nigricans (Serranidae) , 1980, Animal Behaviour.

[19]  J. Wiebes.  A Short Story of Fig Wasp Research , 1977 .

[20]  R. Jervis.  Perception and misperception in international politics , 1976 .

[21]  R. Trivers.  The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism , 1971, The Quarterly Review of Biology.

[22]  G. Hardin,et al.  Tragedy of the Commons , 1968 .

[23]  E. Niebuhr,et al.  Down's syndrome , 1974, Humangenetik.

[24]  Stewart Macaulay.  Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study , 1963 .

[25]  N. Geschwind.  Specializations of the human brain. , 1979, Scientific American.

[26]  Robert Axelrod,et al.  Conflict of interest : a theory of divergent goals with applications to politics , 1971 .

[27]  R. Nydegger.  The effects of information processing complexity and interpersonal cue availability on strategic play in a mixed‐motive game1 , 1980 .

[28]  Jack F. Evernden,et al.  The Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban , 1982 .

[29]  J. M. Smith,et al.  The Logic of Animal Conflict , 1973, Nature.

[30]  George A. Akerlof.  The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism , 1970 .

[31]  Frederick J. Dobney.  The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GATT? By John W. Evans. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 383, 8 tables. $13.95 , 1972 .

[32]  J. Friedman.  A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames , 1971 .

[33]  T. Acton.  Gypsy politics and social change;: The development of ethnic ideology and pressure politics among British gypsies from Victorian reformism to Romany nationalism , 1974 .

[34]  J. Hirshleifer.  Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The Importance of Having the Last Word , 1977 .

[35]  R. Fagen,et al.  When Doves Conspire: Evolution of Nondamaging Fighting Tactics in a Nonrandom-Encounter Animal Conflict Model , 1980, The American Naturalist.

[36]  Ivan D. Chase,et al.  Cooperative and Noncooperative Behavior in Animals , 1980, The American Naturalist.

[37]  S. Schwartz.  Normative Influences on Altruism , 1977 .

[38]  R. Posner,et al.  Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism , 1978, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[39]  Lewis A. Kornhauser,et al.  Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce , 1979, Discussions in Dispute Resolution.

[40]  Stefan Valavanis,et al.  The resolution of conflict when utilities interact , 1958 .

[41]  P. R. David,et al.  Principles of Human Genetics , 1960, Diabetes.

[42]  E. Leigh,et al.  How does selection reconcile individual advantage with the good of the group? , 1977, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[43]  I. Eshel.  On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits: an ecogenetical approach. , 1977, Theoretical population biology.

[44]  J. M. Smith.  The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. , 1974, Journal of theoretical biology.

[45]  Robert J. Art.  The TFX decision : McNamara and the military , 1968 .

[46]  W. Hamilton.  The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. , 1964, Journal of theoretical biology.

[47]  G. Parker,et al.  Selfish genes, evolutionary games, and the adaptiveness of behaviour , 1978, Nature.

[48]  Barbara Hinckley,et al.  Coalitions in Congress: Size and Ideological Distance , 1972 .

[49]  Barton L. Lipman.  Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games , 1985 .

[50]  R. Harris.  Note on "optimal policies for the Prisoner's Dilemma." , 1969 .

[51]  W. Hamilton,et al.  Altruism and Related Phenomena, Mainly in Social Insects , 1972 .

[52]  Ron Luciano.  The Umpire Strikes Back , 1982 .

[53]  W. Hamilton.  Innate social aptitudes of man: an approach from evolutionary genetics , 1975 .

[54]  INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS , 1977 .

[55]  Douglas W. Bethlehem,et al.  The Effect of Westernization on Cooperative Behaviour in Central Africa , 1975 .

[56]  Michael Taylor,et al.  Anarchy and cooperation , 1976 .

[57]  N. Polsby.  The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives , 1968, American Political Science Review.

[58]  D. Kenrick,et al.  The destiny of Europe's gypsies , 1973 .

[59]  J. B. Crowley,et al.  Japan's Decision for War; Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences , 1967 .

[60]  Malvern Lumsden,et al.  The Cyprus Conflict as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game , 1973 .

[61]  Allan G. Bogue,et al.  Of Mess and Men: The Boardinghouse and Congressional Voting, 1821-1842 , 1975 .

[62]  J. Manning.  Sexual reproduction and parent-offspring conflict in the RNA "Tumour" virus/host relationship: implications for vertebrate oncogene evolution. , 1975, Journal of theoretical biology.

[63]  Flint Schier.  Ulysses and the Sirens , 1980 .

[64]  M. Shubik.  Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: three solutions , 1970 .

[65]  Robert C. Calfee,et al.  Cognitive Psychology and Educational Practice , 1981 .

[66]  John Maynard Smith,et al.  The logic of asymmetric contests , 1976, Animal Behaviour.

[67]  J. Ligon,et al.  Communal breeding in green woodhoopoes as a case for reciprocity , 1978, Nature.

[68]  W. Wilson.  Reciprocation and other techniques for inducing cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1971 .

[69]  R. Wrangham.  On the evolution of Ape Social Systems , 1979 .

[70]  Gary S. Becker,et al.  Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology , 1976 .

[71]  E. H. Clarke,et al.  Demand Revelation and the Provision of Public Goods , 1980 .

[72]  C. Brooke Worth,et al.  The Insect Societies , 1973 .

[73]  S. Brams,et al.  The Paradox of Vote Trading , 1973, American Political Science Review.

[74]  M. Shubik,et al.  A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. , 1964 .

[75]  H. Simon,et al.  A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice , 1955 .

[76]  Montgomery Blair,et al.  The First Forty Years of Washington Society , 1906 .

[77]  Ronald Wintrobe.  It Pays to Do Good, but Not to Do More Good than It Pays: A Note on the Survival of Altruism , 1981 .

[78]  War Commentaries of Caesar , 1960 .

[79]  P. Buchner.  Endosymbiosis of Animals with Plant Microorganisms , 1965 .

[80]  C. Hosoya.  Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-1941 , 1968 .

[81]  O. Williamson.  Markets and Hierarchies , 1975 .

[82]  Paul Stoneman.  An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change . By Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. xi, 437. $25.00. , 1986 .

[83]  P. R. Thompson.  "And who is my neighbour?"* An answer from evolutionary genetics , 1980 .

[84]  Stephen E. Berger,et al.  Self-sacrifice, Cooperation and Aggression in Women of Varying Sex-role Orientations , 1974 .

[85]  W. Hamilton.  The moulding of senescence by natural selection. , 1966, Journal of theoretical biology.

[86]  J. Thoday.  Population Genetics , 1956, Nature.

[87]  A. Harcourt.  Strategies of emigration and transfer by primates, with particular reference to gorillas. , 2010, Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie.

[88]  A. Rapoport.  Escape From Paradox , 1967 .

[89]  W. Hamilton.  The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior , 1963, The American Naturalist.

[90]  Gordon Tullock,et al.  A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices , 1976, Journal of Political Economy.

[91]  B. Fitzgerald,et al.  Self-Interest or Altruism , 1975 .