What is Meaning?

the calculus-based approaches. At least if he does not equate them, he skips the statement of their possible differences. In a technical sense, van Zantwijk seems to rate modern logic higher than pre-modern approaches. But there is another respect, in which he thinks of the pre-modern conceptions as more fertile: they have philosophical import insofar as their topics are not formal structures or even structures of models for specific theories, but they are concerned with what van Zantwijk calls the philosophy of science, Wissenschaftsphilosophie (p. 13). This term is opposed toWissenschaftstheorie, which rather accords to the early twentiethcentury understanding of formally analysing structures of explanation devoid of ‘metaphysics’. Pre-modern approaches rely on the philosophical conviction ‘that there are rules of finding which found heuristic methods’ (p. 14). This means that pre-modern ‘logical methodology’claims to be capable of ‘devising scientific methods philosophically’ (p. 14). Van Zantwijk seems to imply that it is impossible for a modern conception of logic to incorporate the materially informed reflection of its own methodology in such a way. However, he marks the pre-modern claim, i.e. a positive answer to the question if universal heuristic is possible, as especially relevant to today’s philosophical reflection of scientific processes (p. 13). Therefore, one might ask if van Zantwijk’s considerations are ultimately tied to a pre-modern conception of logic or if they might be extended or transferred to the framework of today’s logic. Clearly, a calculus-like system cannot itself contain reflections on its meta-language. But it is highly dubitable if all ‘modern’ logic works out as a calculus or even if all ‘modern’ logic ever claimed the status of a calculus. It is true that one might be tempted to save the equation of ‘modern’ and ‘calculus-like’ logic, namely by thinking of proposals in modern logic as made up of clearly separated parts, one of which contains the technical rules, while the other refers to ‘meta-’matters. However, this is not distinctive of ‘modern’ logic. For example, a tentative separation of rather technical and rather intellectual parts can be recognized in traditional textbooks as surveyed by van Zantwijk. In other words, these remarks amount to the question: is modern logic’s exclusion of methodological reflection in van Zantwijk’s sense necessary or is it a contingent result of his study’s setting in the history of problems?