Defending a single object in a defender-attacker game considering time

Many game theoretic models have been proposed to model the interplay between players using false targets. Time, as an important factor, tends to be ignored in the modeling process. This paper fills the gap by analyzing the optimal attack time in a two-period strategic defender-attacker game. In the first period, the attacker spends time and efforts in identifying false targets. Meanwhile, the defender invests efforts in deception or defense to deploy more false targets or strengthen the genuine target, respectively. In the second period, the attacker allocates resources evenly among all the undetected targets. We model and obtain analytical equilibrium results under the basic assumptions to verify the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed model. Comparative study is also carried out to verify the influences of various parameters on the equilibrium. The results can provide decision makers with more insights into making enhanced policy- making decisions and improving the resource allocation process.