A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are thus extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis. Their theory implies that “non-disjunctive” properties are intrinsic if they are independent of “loneliness”; but many ordinary, apparently nondisjunctive, properties satisfy this test but are nevertheless extrinsic in virtue of being maximal. A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. 1 Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis. (1998).
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