I-Level Predicates that Allow Existential Readings for Bare Plurals

The two main approaches in the l iterature to the analysis of bare plural s , those of Carlson and of Kratzer/Diesing l are able to explain this observation, at least for bare plurals in subject position.2 Carlson 1 977, for example, treats I-level predicates as predicates of kinds, leading to the prediction that bare plural subj ects of I-level predicates wi l l receive only generic readings. Note that in the Carlson and KratzerlDiesing accounts, I-level predicates are identified, at least roughly, with permanent or near-permanent properties, although Carlson points out that this correspondence is not complete . A number of exceptions have been observed to the general ization that 1level predicates allow only generic readings for their bare plural subjects (see, for example, Fernald 1 994) . I t i s not very difficult to think of further exceptions . Consider the following: