An Improved Constraint-Based System for the Verification of Security Protocols

We propose a constraint-based system for the verification of security protocols that improves upon the one developed by Millen and Shmatikov [30]. Our system features (1) a significantly more efficient implementation, (2) a monotonic behavior, which also allows to detect flaws associated to partial runs and (3) a more expressive syntax, in which a principal may also perform explicit checks. In this paper we also show why these improvements yield a more effective and practical system.

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