Beyond equilibrium: predicting human behaviour in normal form games

It is standard in multi-agent settings to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies. However, studies in experimental economics demonstrate that Nash equilibrium is a poor description of human players' actual behavior. In this study, we consider a wide range of widely-studied models from behavioral game theory. For what we believe is the first time, we evaluate each of these models in a meta-analysis, taking as our data set large-scale and publicly-available experimental data from the literature. We then propose a modified model that we believe is more suitable for practical prediction of human behavior.

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