Multi-Stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] J. Berger. Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis , 1988 .
[2] Dan Levin,et al. Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry , 1994 .
[3] P. Jehiel,et al. Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats? , 2007 .
[4] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[5] T. Sandholm. Limitations of the Vickrey Auction in Computational Multiagent Systems , 1996 .
[6] David C. Parkes,et al. Auction design with costly preference elicitation , 2005, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.
[7] F. Ygge. Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems , .
[8] Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans,et al. On a Possible Benefit to Bid Takers from Using Multi-Stage Auctions , 1988 .
[9] Eric Bennett Rasmusen,et al. Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions , 2001 .
[10] Tom K. Lee. Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions , 1985 .
[11] T. Sandholm,et al. Costly valuation computation in auctions , 2001 .
[12] Feller William,et al. An Introduction To Probability Theory And Its Applications , 1950 .
[13] J. Rice. Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis , 1988 .
[14] Stuart J. Russell,et al. Principles of Metareasoning , 1989, Artif. Intell..
[15] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium , 2001, Artif. Intell..
[16] D. Farnsworth. A First Course in Order Statistics , 1993 .