Security function interactions

We use a compositional framework to model security architectures involving heterogeneous and distributed security functions. Our goal is to assist the ITSEC evaluation of suitability binding and vulnerability of a set of security functions. We propose constraints that security functions should guarantee in order to interact consistently, and securely with other functions. To illustrate these notions we study the interactions of various components of a secure LAN.

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