Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

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