PROFITABILITY, TRANSACTIONAL ALIGNMENT, AND ORGANIZATIONAL MORTALITY IN THE U.S. TRUCKING INDUSTRY

The winds of creative destruction rarely blow more fiercely than in a newly deregulated environment. Managers simultaneously face a novel focus on operating efficiency and an onslaught of new competitors. What must managers do to enable their firms to survive in such an environment? What factors bear on firms’ survival? This paper presents an analysis of mortality of large motor carriers in the U.S. interstate for-hire trucking industry after deregulation. It examines this phenomenon through a multidisciplinary lens that encompasses organizational ecology, neoclassical economics, and transaction cost economics. The paper posits that carrier mortality is a function of both firm-level and industry-level attributes, which are drawn from both ecological and economic theories. While each of these theories separately informs motor carrier mortality, the inclusion of predictions derived from both disciplines in one model significantly increases explanatory power over either theory evaluated alone. The empirical analysis is among the first to show increased mortality when firms do not adhere to operating policies consistent with transaction cost minimization principles. In sum, managers are well advised to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to strategy to ensure their firms’ survival. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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