Is It Mine or Is It Ours? Framing Property Rights and Decision Making in Social Dilemmas☆☆☆

The present article focuses on two decision problems that can be described as social dilemmas: The provision of public goods and the maintenance of scarce resources. It is argued that the presentation of property rights in social dilemmas may affect the extent to which people feel it is their social responsibility to further the collective's interest. In an experimental study we manipulated the presentation of property rights in Resource dilemmas and Public Good dilemmas. Initial property was either presented as collective property or presented as partitioned property. The results suggest that in Resource dilemmas, presenting initial property as partitioned property may have a negative effect on perceived social responsibility and (thus) on the maintenance of scarce resources. The presentation of initial property did not affect perceived social responsibility and choice behavior in Public Good dilemmas, however. The results are discussed and compared with previous research on property rights and framing in social dilemmas.

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