Information Integrity Policies

Information integrity policies are traditionally enforced by access control mechanisms that prevent unauthorized users from modifying data. However, access control does not provide end-to-end assurance of integrity. For that reason, integrity guarantees in the form of noninterference assertions have been proposed. Despite the appeals of such information-flow based approaches to integrity, that solution is also unsatisfactory because it leads to a weaker notion of integrity than needed

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