Effective UAV and Ground Sensor Authentication

Nowadays, The Internet of Things (IoT) has been widely used in various fields due to its smart sensing and communication capabilities. IoT devices serve as bridges for the cyber system to interact with the physical environment by providing various useful sensing capabilities such as battlefield surveillance, home monitoring, traffic control, etc. These capabilities also make IoT an important role in tactical missions in the military, including Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). Nevertheless, IoT devices are known to have critical issues on security due to constraints on cost and resources. Most existing researches are based on smart sensors that have comparatively more computing and communication resources, while security solutions for dumb sensors are still lacking. Some IoT sensors that are deployed in a hostile environment are dumb due to limitations on cost and power supply, making them more vulnerable to attacks. In this work, we try to tackle this problem by proposing effective authentication solutions between a UAV and dumb IoT devices (also referred to as dumb sensors) within an example application of a UAV-sensor collaborative RISTA mission. We present two different schemes for two-way mutual authentication between the UAV and dumb sensors which utilize non-cryptographic physical layer cover channel and neighboring devices' signal sensing correlations respectively. We demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our schemes with extensive real-world experiments on our prototype deployment.

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