The evolution of focal points

Theories of focal points typically assume that games have inherent labelings or "frames" and then construct models of how players perceive and exploit these frames to identify focal equilibria. This paper asks instead how evolutionary considerations determine which aspects of a frame are likely to be monitored by the players. Efficient monitoring turns out to be an unlikely outcome.

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