The Patron Game: the Individual Provision of a Public Good

The Patron Game studies the individual provision of a public good, i.e., a situation in which the cost of contributing exceeds by construction its private return (e.g., volunteering, Open Collaboration projects). We test the Patron Game in the lab finding that contributions are high, though significantly lower than in a classic Public Good Game. Results show that demand effects and the warm glow of giving account almost entirely for the contributions, with the former playing the most prominent role. The social nature of the individual provision of a public good is confirmed by the fact that, even when the efficiency multiplier is removed, contributions are higher than in comparable Dictator Games.

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