Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory

John Nash’s formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash’s work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory have been developed and how they have changed the course of economic theory. It is shown in particular how the scope of economics has changed from production and allocation of material goods to the study of rational competitive behavior in any institution of society.

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