Can partisan voting lead to truth?

We study an extension of the voter model in which each agent is endowed with an innate preference for one of two states that we term as 'truth' or 'falsehood'. Due to interactions with neighbors, an agent that innately prefers truth can be persuaded to adopt a false opinion (and thus be discordant with its innate preference) or the agent can possess an internally concordant 'true' opinion. Parallel states exist for agents that inherently prefer falsehood. We determine the conditions under which a population of such agents can ultimately reach a consensus for the truth, reach a consensus for falsehood, or reach an impasse where an agent tends to adopt the opinion that is in internal concordance with its innate preference with the outcome that consensus is never achieved.

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