The advantages and disadvantages of expanding the standard economic model by more realistic behavioral assumptions have received much attention. The issue raised in this article is whether it is useful to complicate-or perhaps to enrichthe model of the profit-seeking firm by considering the preferences that people have for being treated fairly and for treating others fairly. The absence of considerations of fairness and loyalty from standard economic theory is one of the most striking contrasts between this body of theory and other social sciences-and also between economic theory and lay intuitions about human behavior. Actions in many domains commonly conform to standards of decency that are more restrictive than the legal ones: the institutions of tipping and lost-and-found offices rest on expectations of such actions. Nevertheless, the standard microeconomic model of the profitmaximizing firm assigns essentially no role to The traditional assumption that fairness is irrelevant to economic analysis is questioned. Even profit-maximizing firms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the individuals with whom they deal are willing to resist unfair transactions and punish unfair firms at some cost to themselves. Three experiments demonstrated that willingness to enforce fairness is common. Community standards for actions affecting customers, tenants, and employees were studied in telephone surveys. The rules of fairness, some of which are not obvious, help explain some anomalous market phenomena. * The research for this paper was supported by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Kahneman and Thaler were also supported, respectively, by the U.S. Office of Naval Research and by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Conversations with J. Brander, R. Frank, and A. Tversky were very helpful. We also thank Leslie McPherson and Daniel Treisman for their assistance. The paper presented at the conference and commented on by the discussants included a detailed report of study 3, which is only summarized here. It did not contain study 1, which was incomplete at the time. Daniel Kahneman is now in the Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley 94720.
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