From primary to presidency: Fake news, false memory, and changing attitudes in the 2016 election

During a contentious primary campaign, people may argue passionately against a candidate they later support during the general election. How do people reconcile such potentially conflicting attitudes? This study followed 602 United States citizens, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, at three points throughout the 2016 presidential election investigating how attitudes and preferences changed over time and how people remembered their past feelings. Across political parties, people’s memory for their past attitudes was strongly influenced by their present attitudes; more specifically, those who had changed their opinion of a candidate remembered their past attitudes as being more like their current attitudes than they actually were. Participants were also susceptible to remembering false news events about both presidential candidates. However, they were largely unaware of their memory biases and rejected the possibility that they may have been susceptible to them. Not remembering their prior attitude may facilitate support of a previously disliked candidate and foster loyalty towards a party nominee during a time of disunity by forgetting they ever used to dislike the candidate.

[1]  S. Barber,et al.  The effects of repetition frequency on the illusory truth effect , 2021, Cognitive research: principles and implications.

[2]  Nathan Walter,et al.  A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Continued Influence of Misinformation in the Face of Correction: How Powerful Is It, Why Does It Happen, and How to Stop It? , 2020, Communication Research.

[3]  Puneet Kaur,et al.  Why do people share fake news? Associations between the dark side of social media use and fake news sharing behavior , 2019, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services.

[4]  E. Loftus,et al.  False Memories for Fake News During Ireland’s Abortion Referendum , 2019, Psychological science.

[5]  David G. Rand,et al.  Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning , 2019, Cognition.

[6]  Nathan Walter,et al.  How to unring the bell: A meta-analytic approach to correction of misinformation , 2018 .

[7]  C. Greene,et al.  Not strange but not true: self-reported interest in a topic increases false memory , 2017, Memory.

[8]  Joseph E. Uscinski,et al.  What Drives Conspiratorial Beliefs? The Role of Informational Cues and Predispositions , 2016 .

[9]  Jeremy Freese,et al.  The Demographic and Political Composition of Mechanical Turk Samples , 2016 .

[10]  Timothy D. Ritchie,et al.  The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Short Form (BIDR-16) , 2015 .

[11]  D. Tingley,et al.  “Who are these people?” Evaluating the demographic characteristics and political preferences of MTurk survey respondents , 2015 .

[12]  E. Loftus,et al.  False Memories of Fabricated Political Events , 2013 .

[13]  Danielle C. Polage,et al.  Making up History: False Memories of Fake News Stories , 2012 .

[14]  Scott A. Guerin,et al.  Memory distortion: an adaptive perspective , 2011, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[15]  Amitav Chakravarti,et al.  Knowing Too Much: Expertise-Induced False Recall Effects in Product Comparison , 2011 .

[16]  Rosanna E. Guadagno,et al.  Preference for consistency and social influence: A review of current research findings , 2010 .

[17]  Stefanie J. Sharman,et al.  False memories for end-of-life decisions. , 2009, Health psychology : official journal of the Division of Health Psychology, American Psychological Association.

[18]  Brian A. Nosek,et al.  Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. , 2009, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[19]  E. Loftus Planting misinformation in the human mind: a 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. , 2005, Learning & memory.

[20]  L. Ross,et al.  The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others , 2002 .

[21]  Joachim I. Krueger,et al.  Enhancement Bias in Descriptions of Self and Others , 1998 .

[22]  L. Levine Reconstructing memory for emotions , 1997 .

[23]  R. Cialdini,et al.  Preference for Consistency: The Development of a Valid Measure and the Discovery of Surprising Behavioral Implications , 1995 .

[24]  J. L. Powell A Test of the Knew-It-All-Along Effect in the 1984 Presidential and Statewide Elections1 , 1988 .

[25]  G. Bower,et al.  Mood effects on person-perception judgments. , 1987, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[26]  M. Ross,et al.  The Relation between Current Impressions and Memories of Self and Dating Partners , 1987 .

[27]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. , 1975 .

[28]  Ullrich K. H. Ecker,et al.  Misinformation and Its Correction , 2012, Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society.

[29]  M. Garry,et al.  Photographs cause false memories for the news. , 2011, Acta psychologica.

[30]  Dan Simon,et al.  Constraint Satisfaction Processes in Social Reasoning , 2003 .

[31]  Reid Hastie,et al.  Illusions of gender: Stereotypes evoke false memories , 2001 .

[32]  L. Atkeson Divisive Primaries and General Election Outcomes: Another Look at Presidental Campaigns , 1998 .

[33]  Hollyn M. Johnson,et al.  Sources of the continued influence effect: When misinformation in memory affects later inferences. , 1994 .

[34]  O. John,et al.  Accuracy and bias in self-perception: individual differences in self-enhancement and the role of narcissism. , 1994, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[35]  D. Bem,et al.  Testing the self-perception explanation of dissonance phenomena: on the salience of premanipulation attitudes. , 1970, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[36]  L. Festinger Cognitive dissonance. , 1962, Scientific American.