论文信息 - A Shapley measure of power in hierarchies

A Shapley measure of power in hierarchies

A method for measuring positional power in hierarchies is proposed. Inspired by models of cooperative TU-games with restricted cooperation, such as permission structures, we model hierarchies by means of a certain kind of set games, which we have called authorization operators. We then define and characterize a value for authorization operators that allows us to quantify the power of each agent. This power is decomposed into two terms: sovereignty and influence. Sovereignty describes the autonomy of an agent. Influence indicates their capacity to block the actions of others.

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