Imperfect monitoring in communication networks

Individuals in many social networks imperfectly monitor other individuals’ network relationships. This paper shows that, in a model of a communication network, imperfect monitoring leads to the existence of many inefficient equilibria. Reasonable restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others’ actions can, however, eliminate many of these inefficient equilibria even with imperfect monitoring. Star networks, known to be efficient in many settings, are shown to have desirable monitoring characteristics. More generally, this paper provides a formal framework in which to study incorrect perceptions as an equilibrium phenomenon in social networks.

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