Control Combinations in Independent Marketing Channels

Abstract Continuing the emergent research on plural governance in interfirm relationships, we hypothesized and verified four control combinations, and empirically investigated antecedent factors resultant in the use of each combination. Different from other reported plural governance studies, we focused on control combinations, rather than each composing control mechanism, as the unit of analysis. Our results indicate that control mechanisms employed simultaneously could play roles of unequal importance: some plays the role of primary control, while others secondary control. This finding challenges the implicit assumption of the extant research that all control mechanisms employed are equal in importance. Additionally, questioning the implicit assumption of the extant research that all governance mechanisms are employed to achieve “active” controls, our results suggest that “passive” controls could be warranted under certain theoretical and practical circumstances. Our study also points to the importance of distinguishing “intended” versus “realized” control mechanisms in interfirm control research.

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