Research on Formal Modeling and Verification of on-board ATP System

Formal software safety verification is an important issue for on-board ATP (Automation Train Protection) system. A SCADE-based model safety formal verification method is designed in this paper. The extracted safety properties of ATP are expressed by formal automaton machine, which is an unambiguous semantics of the formal method ensuring model-based formal verification mechanisms for system safety. Furthermore, the on-board ATP system and the safety properties module are modeled in SCADE suite, and the safety verification by combination of the two models is done in the Design Verifier using SAT-based Bounded model-checking. The advantages of this method are of completeness and can reduce verification costs.

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