Envy based fairness in hedonic games
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Hedonic games are coalition formation games where agents have hedonic preferences for coalition structures. The main focus of hedonic games has been on notion of stability. In this paper, however, we consider envy based fairness in hedonic games. We investigate emptiness of envy-free coalition structures and summarize the relationship with core stability.
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