Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium

Abstract This paper revisits the minimum-effort coordination game with a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function. The resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function. In the limit as the noise vanishes, the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-dominant outcome for 2 × 2 games. In accordance with experimental evidence, logit equilibrium efforts decrease with increases in effort costs and the number of players, even though these parameters do not affect the Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.

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