Some Recent Developments in n-Person Game Theory

A general survey of the mathematical theory of games is presented with particular emphasis on recent developments in the theory of the core and stable sets (solutions) for the multi-person cooperative games in characteristic function form. Extensions to games without side payments, games with infinitely many players, and games in partition function form are mentioned. The history leading up to the discovery of a ten-person game with no stable set is reviewed. The equilibrium theory for noncooperative games in normal form as well as some additional cooperative solution concepts are covered very briefly.

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