Computational Mechanism Design

Computational mechanism design brings together the concern in microeconomics with decision making in the context of distributed private information and self-interest and the concern in computer science with computational and communication complexity. In constructing mechanisms, with application to the design of electronic markets and to protocols for automated negotiation, many new issues arise in resolving tensions between incentive, computation and communication constraints.

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