This paper explores the regional comparative advantage in grain production in China directly according to production and associated costs. Two groups of indicators are used in the study. The first group of indicators includes Net Social Profitability (NSP) and Domestic Resource Costs (DRC), both measuring the net social welfare gained from one production activity against its opportunity costs at border prices. The second group of indicators includes Efficiency Advantage Indices (EAI), Scale Advantage Indices (SAI) and Aggregated Advantage Indices (AAI), which measuring relative yield and scale advantages in a region. The study reveals that the comparative advantage in main grain crops varies significantly across China. It implies that there exists great potential to improve resource allocation and to increase grain production through restructuring of the grain sector. The study also indicates that China is able to compete in the world market even if it as a whole has comparative disadvantage in producing some crops, as some of its provinces may still have comparative advantage in those crops. This implies that detailed analyses at provincial level are needed in projecting China’s grain trade flow in the future.
[1]
J. Beghin,et al.
Food Self-Sufficiency, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade: A Policy Analysis Matrix for Chinese Agriculture
,
2000
.
[2]
C. Carter,et al.
Will Market Prices Enhance Chinese Agriculture?: A Test of Regional Comparative Advantage
,
1991
.
[3]
K. Anderson,et al.
中国比较优势的变化 : 对食品、饲料与纤维市场的影响 = Changing comparative advantages in China:Effects on food,feed and fibre markets
,
1990
.
[4]
Erik Thorbecke,et al.
The Policy Analysis Matrix for Agricultural Development
,
1989
.
[5]
G. Tidrick,et al.
China, Long-Term Development Issues and Options: The Report of a Mission Sent to China by the World Bank
,
1985
.
[6]
S. Pearson,et al.
Comparative Advantage among African Coffee Producers
,
1974
.
[7]
M. Bruno.
Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection: Clarification and Synthesis
,
1972,
Journal of Political Economy.