Distributed Attack Detection and Secure Estimation of Networked Cyber-Physical Systems Against False Data Injection Attacks and Jamming Attacks

This paper is concerned with the problem of joint distributed attack detection and distributed secure estimation for a networked cyber-physical system under physical and cyber attacks. The system is monitored by a wireless sensor network, in which a group of sensors is spatially distributed and the sensors’ measurements are broadcast to remote estimators via a wireless network medium. A malicious adversary simultaneously launches a false data injection attack at the physical system layer to intentionally modify the system's state and jamming attacks at the cyber layer to block the wireless transmission channels between sensors and remote estimators. The sensors’ measurements can be randomly dropped with mathematical probability if the corresponding transmission channels are deliberately jammed by the adversary. Resilient attack detection estimators are delicately constructed to provide locally reliable state estimations and detect the false data injection attack. Then, criteria for analyzing the estimation performance and designing the desired estimators are derived to guarantee the solvability of the problem. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is shown through an illustrative example.