Toward a Theory of Social Venture Franchising

This article examines the relevance of the two main theories used to understand business format franchising—resource scarcity theory and agency theory—for social venture franchising through an in–depth case study of one of the United Kingdom's first and most high–profile social franchises. We posit that both theories can be reframed to take account of the distinctive characteristics of social franchise systems. In developing our arguments, we present four findings that, taken together, move us closer toward a theory of social venture franchising.

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