Analyzing trusted platform communication ?

In this paper we discuss the analysis of trusted platform communication. While the trusted platform module itself is considered reasonably tamper resistant, the communication channel between this module and the rest of the trusted platform turns out to be comparatively insecure. Passive attacks can be mounted on the communication interface with fairly inexpensive equipment and allow eavesdropping of critical information. Performing active manipulation on the communication bus could provide an even stronger attack scenario, resulting in a circumvention of the whole chain of trust provided by trusted platforms. At this stage, our research has been limited to passive attacks.

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