Multiattribute Dyadic Choice: Models and Tests

Three models for resolving a cooperative, dyadic choice problem are formulated and solved. Solutions are presented in n-dimensional attribute space (versus the utility plane) to focus on cognitive conflict between decision makers rather than on goal conflict. Forecasts from the models are compared in a choice experiment. All three models outperform chance in predicting a dyad's first choice, but the nonzero reference point model best predicts second through nth places—a desirable feature for product positioning applications. Recommendations for incorporating the model into choice simulators and expert negotiating systems are provided.

[1]  Mordechai I. Henig,et al.  Multiplicative decision rules for multiobjective decision problems , 1986 .

[2]  L. Shapley A Value for n-person Games , 1988 .

[3]  Paul E. Green,et al.  A General Approach to Product Design Optimization via Conjoint Analysis , 1981 .

[4]  V. Srinivasan,et al.  A Consumer Preference Approach to the Planning of Rural Primary Health-Care Facilities , 1976, Oper. Res..

[5]  M. Bacharach Two-person Cooperative Games , 1976 .

[6]  L. A. Goodman,et al.  Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .

[7]  Donald R. Lehmann,et al.  Models of Cooperative Group Decision-Making and Relative Influence: An Experimental Investigation of Family Purchase Decisions , 1987 .

[8]  E. Kalai Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons , 1977 .

[9]  Louis W. Stern,et al.  Assessing the Predictive Accuracy of Two Utility-Based Theories in a Marketing Channel Negotiation Context , 1986 .

[10]  B. Kemal Büyükkurt,et al.  Robustness and Small-Sample Properties of the Estimators of Probabilistic Multidimensional Scaling (PROSCAL) , 1990 .

[11]  Rakesh K. Sarin,et al.  Group Preference Aggregation Rules Based on Strength of Preference , 1979 .

[12]  Kelvin Lancaster,et al.  Competition and Product Variety , 1980 .

[13]  H. Raiffa,et al.  Decisions with Multiple Objectives , 1993 .

[14]  Zvi A. Livne,et al.  Resolving a Conflict Situation with a Reference Outcome: An Axiomatic Model , 1988 .

[15]  J. Harsanyi Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility , 1955 .

[16]  K. R. Hammond,et al.  Science, values, and human judgment. , 1976, Science.

[17]  J. Nash THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.

[18]  R. L. Winkler,et al.  Risk Sharing and Group Decision Making , 1981 .

[19]  Max H. Bazerman,et al.  Negotiation behavior and decision processes in dyads, groups, and markets , 1990 .

[20]  A. Sen,et al.  Collective Choice and Social Welfare , 2017 .

[21]  George S. Avrunin,et al.  Single-Peaked Functions and the Theory of Preference. , 1977 .

[22]  David J. Curry,et al.  Some Effects of Differing Information Processing Strategies on Husband-Wife Joint Decisions , 1979 .

[23]  John R. Nevin,et al.  The Differential Effects of Exercised and Unexercised Power Sources in a Marketing Channel , 1985 .

[24]  Scott A. Neslin,et al.  The Ability of Nash's Theory of Cooperative Games to Predict the Outcomes of Buyer-Seller Negotiations: A Dyad-Level Test , 1986 .

[25]  J. Nash Two-Person Cooperative Games , 1953 .

[26]  V. Rao,et al.  A Balance Model for Evaluating Subsets of Multiattributed Items , 1976 .

[27]  Peter S. Fader,et al.  Power and Goal Setting in Channel Negotiations , 1986 .

[28]  C. Coombs,et al.  Single-Peaked Functions and the Theory of Preference , 1977 .

[29]  Scott A. Neslin,et al.  Nash's Theory of Cooperative Games as a Predictor of the Outcomes of Buyer-Seller Negotiations: An Experiment in Media Purchasing , 1983 .

[30]  M. Shakun,et al.  Mediator: Towards a Negotiation Support System , 1985 .

[31]  Paul E. Green,et al.  Hybrid Models for Conjoint Analysis: An Expository Review , 1984 .

[32]  H. Raiffa 21. Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-person Games , 1953 .

[33]  Peter A. Diamond,et al.  Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility: Comment , 1967, Journal of Political Economy.

[34]  Stephen J. Hoch,et al.  An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Spousal Predictions , 1986 .

[35]  E. Kalai,et al.  OTHER SOLUTIONS TO NASH'S BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1975 .

[36]  Sunil Gupta,et al.  Testing the emergence and effect of the reference outcome in an integrative bargaining situation , 1990 .