How Important Is Corporate Governance? Evidence from Machine Learning

Imagine a world without corporate governance, where firms do not have independent boards of directors to watch over such issues as environmental awareness, ethical behavior, corporate strategy, compensation, and risk management. In such a world, would firms perform worse? That is, would firms’ profits suffer, would their growth prospects shrink, would it be harder to get a loan, and would other firm characteristics deteriorate?

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