Moral Status and Human Enhancement

The terms 'moral status' and 'moral standing' are sometimes used interchangeably, but in the analysis that follows I will distinguish them. I will say that a being has moral standing if it counts morally, in its own right. For Bentham, all beings that are sentient count morally in their own right. For Kant, only persons, beings with the capacity for practical rationality, have moral standing. On both views, moral standing is not a comparative notion. Moral status, in contrast, is a comparative notion. Two beings can both have moral standing, but one may be of a higher moral status. The idea that different beings with moral standing have different moral statuses is common to otherwise divergent moral theories and is implicit in much pre-theoretical moral thinking as well. A being's moral status can make a difference as to whether its behavior is subject to moral evaluation, how it ought to be treated, whether it has rights, and perhaps what kinds of rights it has. In moral views that include a plurality of moral statuses, it is human beings, or at least human beings who are persons, that are thought to occupy the highest status. A few contemporary moral theorists have begun to develop nuanced views on moral status.1 At the same time, concerns about moral status