‘Honestius quam ambitiosius’? An exploration of the Cynic's attitude to moral corruption in his fellow men

Two important studies have recently appeared of the career and philosophy of the celebrated first-century Cynic Demetrius—an article by J. F. Kindstrand and a monograph by M. Billerbeck. Both scholars discuss Demetrius' defence of P. Egnatius Celer in AD 70. The purpose of the present paper is threefold: (i) to argue that Kindstrand's and Billerbeck's interpretations of this incident, different as they are, must, like all previous interpretations, be rejected; (ii) to offer a new perspective, in the hope of showing that Demetrius' action can be understood as thoroughly honourable; (iii) to demonstrate that Demetrius' action can be understood as not only thoroughly honourable, but also profoundly Cynic. It may be objected that investigation of motive in such a case is intrinsically misguided. The only evidence is a short notice in Tacitus, and it is of course true that we shall never be able to say for certain what Demetrius' motives were. Some modern historians, moreover, deprecate on principle analysis of motive, in the ancient world especially. It seems, nevertheless, both legitimate and worthwhile to attempt to understand the reasons why Demetrius, a Cynic philosopher of (on the normal view) high moral character, should have defended Celer, a Stoic philosopher who (again on the normal view) had revealed himself to be a complete scoundrel. The exercise may also serve to bring out some fundamental points about the Cynics' conception of man and their interpretation of human weakness. For reasons which will become clear below Cynicism was vulnerable to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Demetrius' defence of Celer, I shall argue, provides an instructive paradigm for the correct interpretation of Cynicism.